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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. : 
STEVEN DAVIDSON, : Case No. 981508-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
Whether the District Court erred in denying Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on the ground that the challenged search was 
justified by the medical emergency exception to the warrant 
requirement when: (i) the Defendant was not in need of medical 
assistance at the time of the search; (ii) the District Court 
found that the search was partially motivated by the officer's 
incorrect belief that he was conducting a search incident to a 
lawful arrest; and (iii) the District Court concluded that the 
officer lacked probable cause to conduct the search? 
Standard of Review: The District Court's conclusions of law 
in denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress are reviewed 
nondeferentially for correctness. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229, 1232 (Utah 1996). The factual findings underlying that 
denial are reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" 
standard. Id. Where specific findings are required, the 
District Court's failure to enter such findings is reversible 
error and generally requires that the case be remanded for the 
District Court to make additional findings. Flying Diamond Oil 
Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1989). 
However, remand for additional findings is not necessary if the 
evidence in the record is not in dispute and the appellate court 
can fairly and properly resolve the case on the record before it. 
World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 262 
(Utah 1994). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below at 
R. 6-7, 88-93. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are of central importance to this 
appeal: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i) 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea 
of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, 
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the 
judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of 
any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who 
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the 
plea. 
U.S. Const./ Amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Appellant Steven Davidson appeals his conviction 
of possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. 
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Mr. Davidson was originally charged in the Third District Court 
with possession of drug paraphernalia, possession of marijuana, 
and furnishing false information to a police officer. R. 1. 
Mr. Davidson subsequently moved the District Court to suppress 
the marijuana and paraphernalia on the ground that they were 
discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search of 
Mr. Davidson's person. R. 6-7. After hearing evidence and 
arguments, the District Court, Judge Michael L. Hutchings, denied 
Mr. Davidson's motion. R. 9, 94. Mr. Davidson then pleaded 
guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia, reserving his right 
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress and to withdraw 
his guilty plea if successful on appeal. R. 46, 48. See Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11 (i); State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The other two charges against Mr. Davidson were dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 11, 1998 at approximately 9:30 p.m., Salt Lake City 
Police Officer Alton Hedenstrom was dispatched to 1129 East Third 
Avenue on a report of a possible heroin overdose. R. 69-70. By 
the time he arrived at the scene, paramedics had already arrived 
and were attending to an unconscious man lying face up in the 
kitchen. R. 70. Upon entering the house, Officer Hedenstrom 
also observed several firefighters and another individual he 
later identified as Steven Davidson. R. 70. 
When Officer Hedenstrom walked into the kitchen, the 
paramedics asked him to take Mr. Davidson into another room. 
R. 71. Officer Hedenstrom and Mr. Davidson then walked into the 
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living room where Mr. Davidson sat down on the couch. R. 71. 
Mr. Davidson identified himself to Officer Hedenstrom and 
provided his date of birth. R. 71, 78. However, when Officer 
Hedenstrom asked Mr. Davidson for his address, Mr. Davidson would 
only say that he did not live at the house they were in. R. 71. 
Officer Hedenstrom then asked if the unconscious man lived in the 
house. Mr. Davidson answered, "No, he didn't live there either." 
R. 72. 
According to Officer Hedenstrom, the paramedics were still 
working on the unconscious man in the kitchen at this time. 
R. 72. While Officer Hedenstrom was still trying to find out 
where Mr. Davidson lived, one of the paramedics hollered to him 
to ask Mr. Davidson what drug the unconscious man had taken. 
R. 72. Officer Hedenstrom testified that Mr. Davidson refused to 
provide any information about drugs or drug paraphernalia. 
R. 72-73. 
Officer Hedenstrom then placed Mr. Davidson under arrest, 
handcuffed him, and searched him. R. 74. At the suppression 
hearing, Officer Hedenstrom testified that he searched 
Mr. Davidson because "It's a standard procedure when someone is 
arrested to search them for weapons and anything else. I was 
hoping to find the drug paraphernalia that this man had overdosed 
on that could help him." R. 74. Although Officer Hedenstrom did 
not find the drugs or paraphernalia the unconscious man had used, 
he did find marijuana and a marijuana pipe. R. 74. 
Mr. Davidson was subsequently charged with possession of 
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marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and furnishing false 
information to a police officer.1 Mr. Davidson moved to 
suppress the marijuana and drug paraphernalia, arguing that they 
were discovered as the result of an unconstitutional search. 
R. 6-7. Specifically, Mr. Davidson argued that the search could 
not be justified as a search incident to his arrest because 
Officer Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Davidson had committed a crime at the time he was arrested 
and searched. R. 87. Although the District Court agreed that 
Officer Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to arrest 
Mr. Davidson prior to the search, the court concluded that the 
search could be justified under the medical emergency exception 
to the warrant requirement. R. 92-94. In reaching this 
conclusion, the District Court found: 
In this case, the officers motivation and the opinion 
of the court was to ascertain what substance this 
person who is on the table who is being worked on . . . 
what substance this person was under the influence of. 
. . . The officer did not have probable cause to 
search. [E]xigent circumstances doesn't require 
probable cause to search and this case that it . . . 
probable cause to search for any other crime. The 
reason for the search was in the opinion of the court, 
a desire to ah, obtain information that he was not 
obtaining any other way. And ah, the reason for the 
ah, search, the motivation in the opinion of the court 
was a health safety and welfare ah, circumstance. In 
light of the fact that the individual was ah, 
apparently suffering some type of an overdose, there 
certainly was not enough time for the officer to obtain 
a search warrant, even call on the phone and obtain a 
telephonic search warrant. The rational of the court 
is this is exigent circumstances because of the 
1
 The allegations giving rise to the false information charge 
occurred after Mr. Davidson was arrested and searched, [R. 74-75], 
and are not relevant to the issues presented for appeal. 
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exigency of the circumstances, the officer was 
authorized to conduct an arrest. Now, we've heard the 
officer articulate on the witness stand also that he 
was doing so because of an obstruction of justice. Our 
law states even if the officer is incorrect in his 
assessment, the legal assessment of the situation ah, 
he's still authorized to move forward in this 
particular case, he did. I . . He had . . . in the 
opinion of the court, in his mind he had two basis; 
Obstruction of Justice which would have justified the 
search; and exigent circumstances. I rule against the 
government on the obstruction of justice issue. I rule 
in favor of the government on the exigency of 
circumstances issue. The motion is denied. 
R. 93-94. Mr. Davidson appeals his subsequent conviction on the 
basis that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In denying Mr. Davidson's motion to suppress, the District 
Court misapplied the medical emergency exception to the warrant 
requirement. The medical emergency exception permits warrantless 
searches of premises or of persons apparently in need of 
immediate medical assistance where (i) the searching officer is 
primarily motivated by his perceived need to render aid or 
assistance, (ii) the officer had reasonable grounds to believe 
that an emergency existed requiring his immediate aid or 
assistance, and (iii) the officer had probable cause to believe 
that the item he was looking for would be found in the place to 
be searched. The District Court first erred in applying this 
exception to the search of a person not himself in need of 
assistance -- the exception is limited to searches of premises or 
of persons who are themselves in need of medical attention. The 
District Court also erred in upholding the search without finding 
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that Officer Hedenstrom's primary motivation for the search was 
his desire to help the unconscious man. Finally, the District 
Court erroneously held that probable cause to search is not a 
requirement of the medical emergency exception and consequently 
erred in upholding the search after concluding that Officer 
Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to search Mr. Davidson. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
Mr. DAVIDSONS MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE GROUND THAT 
OFFICER HEDENSTROM'S SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE 
MEDICAL EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
protects M[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const., Amend. IV. The Fourth 
Amendment prohibits all unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
"it is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, 
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only 
to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.'" Mincey v. Arizona 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)), accord 
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995). One such 
recognized exception permits warrantless searches when "the 
exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so 
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable. 
Mincey at 394; see also State v. Pursifull, 751 P.2d 825, 827 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("police officers [may] conduct limited, 
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warrantless entries and searches of premises in emergency 
situations."). 
The first formal statement of this so-called "emergency" 
exception appeared in Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963), where then Judge Warren Burger noted that 
a warrant is not required to break down a door to enter 
a burning home to rescue occupants or extinguish a 
fire, to prevent a shooting or to bring emergency aid 
to an injured person. The need to protect or preserve 
life or avoid serious injury is justification for what 
would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or 
emergency. 
Id. at 212. Although this doctrine initially had only limited 
application to police entries into buildings, it was soon 
expanded to justify a warrantless search of a person. In Vauss 
v. United States, 370 F.2d 250 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the police found 
a man unconscious on a street and while searching his pockets for 
identification they discovered narcotics. The court held the 
narcotics were legally seized, stating that "[a] search of one 
found in a unconscious condition is both legally permissible and 
highly necessary." Id. at 252. Since then, numerous courts have 
applied the now so-called "medical emergency" exception to uphold 
warrantless searches of persons found in an unconscious or 
semiconscious condition when the purpose of the search is to find 
information that might enhance the prospect of providing 
appropriate medical assistance. See, e.g., United States v. 
Haley, 581 F.2d 723, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1978); People v. Gomez, 40 
Cal. Rptr. 616, 617-18 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); People v. Smith, 
265 N.E.2d 139, 140-41 (111. 1970); State v. Auman, 386 N.W.2d 
8 
818, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Perez v. State, 514 S.W.2d 748, 
749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Nonetheless, this author can find no 
case in which any court has ever upheld a search of a person not 
himself in need of medical treatment pursuant to the medical 
emergency exception. See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, 
Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical 
Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52 
(1993). 
Although no majority of either Utah appellate court has 
found it necessary to set forth the specific requirements of the 
medical emergency exception, Judge Greenwood of the Utah Court of 
Appeals has recognized the exception and has set forth the 
following elements that must be proved before a warrantless 
search will be upheld: 
(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe 
that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate 
need for their assistance for the protection of life or 
property. 
(2) The search must not be primarily motivated by 
intent to arrest and seize evidence. 
(3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating 
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the 
area or place to be searched. 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(Greenwood, J. concurring) (quoting People v. Mitchell, 347 
N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976)). Courts in other states have 
established substantially similar elements of the medical 
emergency exception. E.g., State v. Resler, 306 N.W.2d 918, 923 
(Neb. 1981); People v. Kahn, 638 N.Y.S.2d 858, 861 (N.Y. Crim. 
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Ct. 1995) State v. Cheers, 607 N.E.2d 115, 117 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1992) . 
A. BECAUSE MR. DAVIDSON WAS NOT HIMSELF IN NEED OF 
ASSISTANCE AT THE TIME HE WAS SEARCHED, THE DISTRICT 
COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE SEARCH PURSUANT TO THE 
MEDICAL EMERGENCY EXCEPTION 
As stated above, searches conducted without a warrant are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a 
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 
Mincey at 390; Katz at 357; Shoulderblade at 294. These 
exceptions have been carefully drawn and jealously guarded. 
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979); State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). From these general principles 
necessarily follows the rule that exceptions to the search 
warrant requirement have not been and should not be created or 
expanded in the absence of a compelling reason to do so. Cf. 
State v. Davis, 666 P.2d 802, 812 (Or. 1983) (en banc) (declining 
to expand emergency exception to allow warrantless entry into 
home to "neutralize" area after emergency had dissipated) (cited 
with approval in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 16-17 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993) ) . 
Although the medical emergency exception has already been 
expanded to allow warrantless searches of individuals who are in 
need of immediate medical assistance, it cannot justify a 
warrantless search of a healthy bystander. To explain this 
proposition, it is first necessary to recognize the extent of 
protection the Fourth Amendment affords persons whom police 
officers desire to "frisk." In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 
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the Supreme Court discussed the reasons for this protection, 
first describing the nature of a "frisk" as follows: 
11
 [T] he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every 
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must 
be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline 
and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and 
entire surface of the legs down to the feet." 
Id. at 17, n.13 (quoting Prior & Martin, Searching and Disarming 
Criminals, 45 J. Crim L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954)). Recognizing the 
highly intrusive nature of such a "frisk", the Court stated: 
It is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure 
performed in public by a policeman while the citizen 
stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands 
raised, is a petty indignity. It is a serious 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may 
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, 
and it is not to be undertaken lightly. 
Id. at 16-17 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
Against this backdrop, this court must decide whether to broaden 
the medical emergency exception to uphold Officer Hedenstrom's 
search of Mr. Davidson.2 
The medical emergency exception arose from the recognition 
that the need to protect life or avoid serious injury is 
generally paramount to the right of privacy. People v. Wright, 
804 P.2d 866, 869-70 (Colo. 1991) (en banc). When viewed in 
isolation, this single statement of policy would appear to 
support expansion of the medical emergency exception to searches 
2
 While the record is silent as to the nature and extent of 
the search at issue in this case, we can presume that it was more 
invasive than the limited "frisk" described in Terry. Officer 
Hedenstrom thought he was searching Mr. Davidson incident to his 
arrest for obstructing justice -- a search which would clearly 
extend beyond the subject's outer clothing and into his pockets and 
other areas not easily accessible. 
11 
of healthy bystanders. However, a close examination of the 
development and historical application of the exception suggest 
two additional factors, both of which weigh against such 
expansion: (i) an unconscious or semiconscious person in need of 
immediate medical assistance has a lesser expectation of privacy 
vis-a-vis a police officer desiring to help that person than a 
healthy bystander would have; and (ii) one who does not or cannot 
object to being searched is afforded less protection under the 
Fourth Amendment than one who does object. 
First, it is clear that one who is unconscious or 
semiconscious and is in need of immediate medical assistance has 
a lesser expectation of privacy vis-a-vis a police officer 
desiring to help that person than a healthy bystander would have. 
We can presume that most people would readily give up some degree 
of privacy as a condition precedent to receiving necessary 
medical care. In fact, it cannot be doubted that millions of 
people in this country give up some degree of privacy every day 
as they seek medical care, whether that care is necessary or 
merely preventive. For example, a routine physical checkup 
usually requires the patient to remove his or her clothing and to 
submit to a "hands-on" examination by a doctor or nurse. 
Patients under these circumstances have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than people not seeking medical care. 
Moreover, this phenomenon is not limited to those seeking 
the care of a medical professional. For example, an unconscious 
person just rescued from drowning in a swimming pool would 
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certainly not object to receiving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation 
from a lifeguard if that treatment were necessary to save the 
person's life. Similarly, a man choking in a restaurant would 
naturally consent to the waiter's performing the heimlich 
maneuver. And an individual with a heart condition might ask a 
stranger to search his coat pockets for medication necessary to 
alleviate severe chest pain. In these and other situations, the 
person in need of medical assistance has a lesser expectation of 
privacy than his or her healthy counterpart. 
The medical emergency exception allows searches of persons 
in need of medical assistance in part because those persons have 
a lesser expectation of privacy than persons not in such need. 
Like the patient seeking a doctor's care, the drowning swimmer 
receiving mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, the choking man receiving 
the heimlich maneuver, and the individual asking a stranger to 
find his heart medicine, an unconscious or semiconscious person 
in need of immediate medical care would generally not object to a 
police officer's careful search of the person for something that 
might facilitate the necessary treatment. 
This lesser-expectation-of-privacy rationale explains why 
the courts have not generally hesitated to apply the medical 
emergency exception to searches of persons in need of medical 
assistance. It is well established that the degree of protection 
the Fourth Amendment provides corresponds to the subject's 
expectation of privacy. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 390-93 (1985) (discussing lesser-expectation-of-privacy 
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rationale for automobile exception to search warrant 
requirement). A police officer's search of a person in need of 
medical assistance in order to gather information necessary to 
provide that assistance is not only necessary for the 
preservation of life or limb, but it is also likely to be exactly 
what the person searched would have expected and wanted. The 
significance of the lesser-expectation-of-privacy rationale under 
these circumstances is underscored by the fact that no court has 
ever applied the medical emergency exception to a search of a 
healthy bystander who's expectation of privacy has not been 
diminished. See generally Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, 
Lawfulness of Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical 
Emergency Exception to Warrant Requirement, 11 A.L.R.5th 52 
(1993) . 
The second factor weighing against further expansion of the 
medical emergency exception to excuse the search of Mr. Davidson 
is the general rule that one who asserts his right to privacy is 
afforded greater protection under the Fourth Amendment than one 
who does not. See, e.g., State v. Roister, 869 P.2d 993, 995 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994) (defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were 
not violated by search of package in which defendant had not 
asserted his right to privacy). In a typical application of the 
medical emergency exception, the person to be searched is not 
physically capable of either consenting to or objecting to the 
search. In contrast, Mr. Davidson strenuously objected. R. 86. 
To further develop this distinction, it is helpful to 
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consider the permissible scope of a police investigation of a car 
accident in which the driver was rendered unconscious. First, 
there is no question that Utah law allows a police officer to 
obtain a blood sample from the unconscious driver. State v. 
Wight, 765 P. 2d 12, 16 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) .3 However, if the 
driver were capable of objecting to the blood draw and did, in 
fact, object, it is equally clear that the driver's blood could 
not be drawn. State v. Cruz, 446 P.2d 307, 308-09 (Utah 1968). 
Similarly, courts have held that a police officer may search an 
unconscious person pursuant to the medical emergency exception, 
but they have not applied that exception to uphold searches of 
persons who were capable of and actually objected to the search. 
See, e. g., Wright, 804 P.2d at 870 (medical emergency exception 
did not justify search of defendant's purse at time when 
defendant was conscious and "fully able to disclose information 
that might be useful in her diagnosis and treatment."); See 
generally Bateman.4 
3
 A blood draw constitutes a search subject to the same Fourth 
Amendment constraints as Officer Hedenstrom's search of Mr. 
Davidson. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). 
4
 Plaintiff/Appellee Salt Lake City (the "City") might attack 
this analogy, arguing that the taking of a blood sample from an 
unconscious driver is allowed by Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10, pursuant to which drivers in the State of 
Utah are deemed to have consented to such chemical tests. The City 
will suggest that the analogy does not hold because the Implied 
Consent Law applies only to drivers, not to others who are 
unconscious and in need of medical attention. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that implied 
consent "is nothing more than a legal fiction . . . indulged to 
avoid possible constitutional difficulties in requiring an alcohol 
test." Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337-38 (Utah 1979). Thus, the 
Implied Consent Law reflects a policy judgment that it is more 
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Carrying the analogy even further, although Utah law allows 
a police officer to take a blood sample from the unconscious 
driver, the officer cannot take a blood sample from an uninjured 
passenger in the same vehicle. A healthy bystander such as 
Mr. Davidson is comparable to this uninjured passenger. In both 
situations, the subject could certainly agree to provide the 
information the officer is looking for, voluntarily submit to a 
blood draw, or consent to a search. However, just as no law or 
policy would allow a police officer to require the uninjured 
passenger to submit to a blood draw, this court should not 
authorize the search of a healthy bystander in the absence of his 
or her consent. 
In the present case, Officer Hedenstrom testified that he 
did not ask for Mr. Davidson's consent to search,5 and he does 
not remember whether or not Mr. Davidson objected to the search. 
important to detect and subsequently convict drunk drivers than to 
protect the privacy right of drivers who are unable to object to a 
blood draw. But the fact that the Implied Consent Law does not 
authorize the taking of a blood sample from a conscious driver over 
the driver's objection, Cruz, 446 P. 2d at 308-09, also reflects an 
important policy judgment: that the need to gather evidence of 
drunk driving does not prevail over the privacy right of one who 
actually objects to the search. 
Similarly, applying the medical emergency exception to the 
search of an unconscious person reflects the policy judgment that 
the need to preserve life and limb is paramount to an unconscious 
person's right of privacy. However, following the countervailing 
policy of the Implied Consent Law, police officers should not be 
allowed to conduct a search over the specific and strenuous 
objection of the person to be searched. Thus, the analogy holds. 
5
 Indeed, Officer Hedenstrom would have had no reason to ask 
for Mr. Davidson's consent -- the officer thought he was conducting 
a search incident to arrest which he could have done even over Mr. 
Davidson's objection. 
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R. 83. However, Mr. Davidson testified that he specifically 
objected to being searched, to which Officer Hedenstrom responded 
"We're not asking your permission." R. 86. In the face of such 
an objection, Officer Hedenstrom should not have proceeded with 
the search and the medical emergency exception should not apply. 
In short, despite the strong public policy favoring the 
medical emergency exception, the countervailing policy of 
protecting the privacy rights of healthy bystanders who clearly 
object to being searched must prevail. The legislature and the 
courts have abided by this judgment in the context of drunk 
driving investigations and this court should do the same. For 
these reasons, this court should decline to expand the medical 
emergency exception to uphold the search of Mr. Davidson and 
should therefore reverse the decision of the trial court. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING OFFICER 
HEDENSTROM7S SEARCH AFTER FINDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS 
PARTIALLY MOTIVATED BY THE OFFICER'S INCORRECT BELIEF 
THAT HE WAS CONDUCTING A SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL 
ARREST. 
As Judge Greenwood indicated in her concurring opinion in 
Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, one requirement of the medical emergency 
exception is that the search was not primarily motivated by the 
officer's intent to arrest and seize evidence. Id. at 550. In 
the present case, the District Court erred in upholding Officer 
Hedenstrom's search of Mr. Davidson without considering this 
requirement. In fact, the District Court found that the officer 
was at least partially motivated by the "standard procedure" 
under which an arrested person is searched "for weapons and 
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anything else." R. 74. Although the court found that Officer 
Hedenstrom did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Davidson, 
the court upheld the search. R. 93-94. 
In Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975), the court 
expounded upon the importance of identifying the searching 
officer's primary motivation for the search. There, the court 
stated: 
[P]olice officers have a customary duty to protect the 
lives and welfare of the citizens at large. . . . 
However, this duty may not be used as a subterfuge for 
invading an individual's constitutional rights. 
Id. at 842. 
In Schraff, a police officer searched the defendant's wallet 
for identification and found drugs. At the suppression hearing, 
the officer testified that he wanted the identification for two 
reasons: (i) the defendant may have committed a criminal act and 
"it's routine procedure to identify" suspects; and (ii) the 
defendant was apparently under the influence of drugs and it was 
unknown whether "he's subsequently going to need medical 
attention." Id. at 844. The court found that the search did not 
fall within the medical emergency exception because its purpose 
was not solely to render aid, but also to investigate suspected 
criminal activity. The court distinguished other cases in which 
searches were upheld pursuant to the medical emergency exception, 
stating that "[i]n the other cases, the officers claimed that 
their only motivation was that of rendering aid to an injured 
person." Id. 
The facts in the present case are very similar to those in 
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Schraff. Officer Hedenstrom testified that he did not search 
Mr. Davidson until he had decided to place him under arrest and 
handcuff him because he refused to answer all of the officer's 
questions. R. 74. When asked why Mr. Davidson was searched, 
Officer Hedenstrom answered "It's a standard procedure when 
someone is arrested to search them for weapons and anything 
else." [Id.] Then, almost as an afterthought, Officer 
Hedenstrom indicated that he was "hoping to find the drug 
paraphernalia that this man had overdosed on that could help 
him." [Id.] 
The District Court interpreted this conflicting testimony to 
mean that Officer Hedenstrom was motivated to search Mr. Davidson 
by two factors. The court stated: 
Now, we've heard the officer articulate on the witness 
stand also that he was doing so because of an 
obstruction of justice. Our law states even if the 
officer is incorrect in his assessment, the legal 
assessment of the situation ah, he's still authorized 
to move forward in this particular case, he did. I .. 
He had . . . in the opinion of the court, in his mind 
he had two basis: Obstruction of Justice which would 
have justified the search; and exigent circumstances. 
I rule against the government on the obstruction of 
justice issue. I rule in favor of the government on 
the exigency of circumstances issue. 
R. 94. Although the District Court attempted to reconcile 
Officer Hedenstrom's conflicting motivations, it failed to 
categorize these motivations as primary or secondary. Instead, 
the court simply held that because one of the two reasons for the 
search was to help the unconscious man, the search was justified. 
However, the medical emergency exception requires more; the court 
must find that the primary motivation for the search was not to 
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arrest and seize evidence. The absence of such a finding in this 
case requires reversal. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784 
n.26 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[w]here specific findings are 
required, failure to enter such findings is reversible error 
unless the facts in the record 'are clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment'") 
(quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)); 
accord State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 980 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
Ordinarily, a trial court's failure to make findings on all 
issues necessary to support its judgment requires that the case 
be remanded for the trial court to make additional findings. 
Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622 
(Utah 1989) . However, remand for additional findings is not 
necessary if the evidence in the record is not in dispute and the 
appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the case on the 
record before it. World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency 
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 262 (Utah 1994) (citing Flying Diamond). 
In this case, Officer Hedenstrom's testimony clearly 
indicates that his primary motivation for searching Mr. Davidson 
was to comply with "standard procedure when someone is arrested 
to search them for weapons and anything else." R. 74. Although 
the officer probably did want to help the unconscious man if he 
could have, the record cannot support a finding that this was his 
primary motivation. Because the record could not support this 
essential finding as a matter of law, remand for additional 
findings is not necessary. 
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C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT OFFICER 
HEDENSTROM'S SEARCH WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE MEDICAL 
EMERGENCY EXCEPTION WITHOUT ALSO CONCLUDING THAT 
PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO BELIEVE THAT Mr. DAVIDSON WAS 
IN POSSESSION OF DRUGS OR DRUG PARAPHERNALIA. 
The final element of the medical emergency exception 
requires that the searching officer had "a reasonable basis, 
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the 
area or place to be searched." Yoder at 550. In this case, not 
only did the District Court fail to reach this conclusion, the 
court actually stated just the opposite conclusion: "The officer 
did not have probable cause to search." R. 93.6 Nonetheless, 
the court upheld the search pursuant to the medical emergency 
exception. Because the City could not establish the requisite 
nexus between the emergency and the person searched, the District 
Court erred in upholding the search pursuant to the medical 
emergency exception. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court misapplied the medical emergency 
exception in upholding Officer Hedenstrom's search of 
6
 In fact, this is the only logical conclusion the District 
Court could have drawn in light of the facts presented. Officer 
Hedenstrom testified that the only reasons he had to suspect that 
a search of Mr. Davidson might be helpful to the unconscious man 
were: (i) Mr. Davidson was present in the apartment with the 
unconscious man when Officer Hedenstrom arrived at the scene; and 
(ii) Mr. Davidson refused to answer all of the officer's questions. 
R. 80-82. However, Officer Hedenstrom did not see Mr. Davidson in 
possession of drugs or drug paraphernalia prior to the search and 
Mr. Davidson made no statements prior to the search which would 
have supported a suspicion that he was in possession of anything 
that might have been helpful in treating the unconscious man. The 
conclusion is inescapable: Officer Hedenstrom did not have a 
reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to believe that he 
would have found anything useful in Mr. Davidson's possession. 
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Mr. Davidson. Accordingly, Mr. Davidson's conviction should be 
reversed, the case should be remanded for Mr. Davidson to 
withdraw his guilty plea, and the District Court should be 
instructed that the evidence discovered pursuant to Officer 
Hedenstrom's illegal search may not be used against Mr. Davidson 
at trial. 
SUBMITTED this Jj^-bt day of February, 1999. 
DAVIlf S. KOTTLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM B 
Burden in a motion to suppress is on the prosecution to show why it was legal. 
In this case I haven't heard any cases cited to show an exception to the warrant 
requirement. It's well established that the search, I mean in this case it's clear, 
the search was improper unless it fits within the valid exception to the warrant 
requirement. It's the City's burden to explain to the court what specific 
established exception to the warrant requirement applies and they haven't done 
that, they haven't cited a case, exit and circumstances by itself is not enough and 
they got the burden, it's not me and all I'm saying is that it's not enough. I don't 
have to go out and find a case that says exigent circumstances is not enough. I 
(inaudible) representation to the court but we haven't heard anything to the 
contrary and we're not looking at what's ah, common sense or whether any ah, 
port of equity would do in this kind of situation. We're following the constitution 
and clearly there's not an exception to the warrant requirement that applies here. 
Okay. In this case the court denies the defense motion ah, the rational of the 
court is that there was...the officer did have exigent circumstances here. My 
understanding of exigent circumstances is that the warrant requirement does not 
apply when an officer has exigent circumstances when health or safety or welfare 
is involved. In this case, the officers motivation and the opinion of the court was 
to ascertain what substance this person who is on the table who is being worked 
on...what substance this person was under the influence of. What were the 
conditions, the characteristics that may have predicated or led up to the particular 
event. The officer did not have probable cause to search exigent circumstances 
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doesn't require probable cause to search and this case that it...probable cause to 
search for any other crime. The reason for the search was in the opinion of the 
court, a desire to ah, obtain information that he was not obtaining any other way. 
And ah, the reason for the ah, search, the motivation in the opinion of the court 
was a health safety and welfare ah, circumstance. In light of the fact that the 
individual was ah, apparently suffering some type of an overdose, there certainly 
was not enough time for the officer to obtain a search warrant, even call on the 
phone and obtain a telephonic search warrant. The rational of the court is this 
is exigent circumstances because of the exigency of the circumstances, the officer 
was authorized to conduct an arrest. Now, we've heard the officer articulate on 
the witness stand also that he was doing so because of an obstruction of justice. 
Our law states even if the officer is incorrect in his assessment, the legal 
assessment of the situation ah, he's still authorized to move forward in this 
particular case, he did. I...He had...in the opinion of the court, in his mind he 
had two basis; Obstruction of Justice which would have justified the search; and 
exigent circumstances. I rule against the government on the obstruction of justice 
issue. I rule in favor of the government on the exigency of circumstances issue. 
The motion is denied. At this time, ah, do you want the matter set for trial, or 
how do you wish to proceed? 
Umm. Your Honor, actually we could set the matter for ummm. I think we've 
requested a jury trial. I did have another Motion that I would like to file. I 
would like to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance concealing identity 
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